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Abstract 
We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. 
In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust 
their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province 
based on electoral competition and political alignment of incumbent mayors. This 
effect only exists in corporate lending as opposed to consumer loans. It creates credit 
constraints for firms in opposition areas, which suffer drops in employment and sales 
but not firm entry. There is substantial misallocation of financial resources as 
provinces and industries with high initial efficiency suffer the greatest constraints.  
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Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of 
Political Misalignment 
 
1. Introduction 
What are the consequences of political influence on banking and economic 
outcomes? Theories of political lending cycles predict that governments use 
loans by state-owned banks as a strategic tool for re-election purposes. In 
particular, bank credit can be reallocated around election years with the aim of 
shifting local election outcomes in favour of the ruling party or coalition parties 
in control of central government. Does such targeted redistribution simply 
favour certain regions, or can it be used to punish others on the basis of their 
attractiveness to politicians? If so, does this reallocation have real effects on the 
local economy?  
We test theories of political cycles in Turkey using the universe of bank credit 
and corporate balance sheet data for the country over the past fifteen years. We 
collect detailed information on election outcomes, banking activity, and 
indicators of economic activity observed at the local level. Unlike previous 
literature, we can draw on quarterly data to identify the exact timing of politically 
induced lending and shed light on potential mechanisms. Our data allow us to 
differentiate between the effects of politically driven lending on firms and 
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consumers separately. We complement these data with information from 
corporate balance sheets aggregated at the industry-by-province level for the 
entirety of the Turkish firms in operation. This allows us to quantify the extent to 
which politically induced lending distorts economic outcomes and leads to 
misallocation of financial resources at the aggregate level.  
We document two main sets of findings. First, we show that state-owned banks 
engage in strategic lending around local elections when compared with private 
banks. In contrast to earlier literature, state-owned banks curb aggregate credit 
prior to local elections and increase lending immediately afterward. However, 
this result is driven by cross-sectional reallocation of credit between 
constituencies defined by their political alignment and the degree of electoral 
competition. In particular, state bank lending increases in provinces when an 
incumbent mayor aligned with the ruling party in central government faces 
competition from opposition parties. In contrast, closely contested provinces get 
relatively less credit from state banks in the run up to elections if the incumbent 
mayor is from an opposition party. We interpret this vastly different behaviour 
of state banks around elections as strong evidence for the existence of a political 
lending cycle, consistent with incentives of “tying your enemy’s hands in close 
races” (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). It appears that the central government – via 
its control over state banks – strategically targets provinces either to support their 
own mayors, or to punish opposition mayors, so that their candidates have a 
better chance in upcoming elections.  
Election cycles and close election outcomes provide a quasi-exogenous variation 
in how aggregate credit is reallocated across the country. We expect this 
reallocation to have real consequences if borrowers are unable to switch lenders, 
meaning that politically induced lending might alleviate credit constraints in 
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aligned provinces and exacerbate them in non- aligned provinces.1 In our second 
set of findings, we present evidence that local economic activity is strongly 
influenced by this reallocation. Economic activity suffers in provinces with an 
opposition mayor and close electoral competition in industries in which state 
banks have a larger share of the credit market nationally. We draw on 
administrative data collected from balance sheets and income statements of 
every formally registered firm in Turkey and aggregated to the industry and 
province level to document these effects. In particular, we show that industries 
with a high share of state bank lending located in politically contested provinces 
experience substantial reductions in employment, sales, and assets in the run up 
to local elections if the incumbent mayor is from an opposition party. We find the 
exact opposite patterns for provinces if the incumbent mayor is from the ruling 
party, although these estimates are not statistically significant.  
In line with the interpretation that this reallocation of economic activity is driven 
by the political lending cycle, we find that credit extended to the corporate sector 
follows the same pattern. Businesses in politically non-aligned provinces appear 
unable to switch lenders around local elections and suffer financial constraints, 
especially in their access to longer term credit. In contrast, businesses in 
provinces that are aligned with the ruling party have easier access to credit. We 
further document that credit growth in the run up to a local election suffers in 
opposition provinces especially in industries with initially higher efficiency, as 
measured by their return on assets. As industries respond to tightening financial 
constraints by shedding employment and assets, politically induced lending 
                                               
1 We use the terms ’aligned’ and ’allied’ interchangeably throughout the text. Either 
terminology refers to incumbent mayors affiliated with the ruling-party in central government, 
while ’non-aligned’ or ’non-allied’ refers to mayors affiliated with any of the opposition parties. 
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potentially gives rise to long-lasting adverse effects on aggregate productivity 
and growth in these regions.  
Our identification strategy builds on difference-in-differences estimates that 
exploit the greater susceptibility of state-owned banks to political pressure 
compared with private banks. We use cross-sectional variation in electoral 
competition and political alignment across localities to identify elements of 
tactical redistribution and rule out alternative explanations. On the one hand, 
private banks may also be subject to political influence (Chavaz and Rose, 2018; 
Akey et al., 2017) and they may respond to competition from state banks. In that 
case, our estimations constitute a lower bound for the true size of the political 
cycle in politically aligned regions.  
On the other hand, we control for various sets of bank and province fixed effects, 
which help us control for unobservable and demand-driven explanations of the 
lending cycle, since local economic shocks correlated with the election cycle 
should affect private banks similarly. In addition, we collect novel data on the 
rewarding of investment incentives by the central government, which come with 
promises of job creation, and all new construction projects started by the public 
sector to test whether an electoral cycle in the distribution of public funds may 
drive our results. While there is suggestive evidence that public funds are 
channeled to political allies in the run up to elections, there is no corresponding 
evidence for opposition regions. We therefore believe that the political lending 
cycle is mostly driven by supply-side rather than demand-side factors. 
Nevertheless, we cannot fully rule out potential mechanisms in which firms 
adjust their borrowing, investment, and employment decisions based on 
expectations about future rewards or punishments by the central government.  
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In our empirical setup, we take advantage of the Turkish electoral system, which 
differentiates between the election of district and metropolitan mayors, to create 
an exact match between political, credit, and real outcomes at the province level. 
Our identification is strongest in metropolitan provinces where a single mayor is 
elected by the majority of votes coming from all voters located in that province.2 
This helps us derive precise estimates for political competition and avoid vote 
aggregation issues encountered by earlier studies. Furthermore, we draw on a 
newly available quarterly dataset of bank loans to explore the lending cycle in a 
higher frequency, which helps differentiate between competing theories of 
political cycles.  
The literature on targeted redistribution distinguishes between constant 
patronage, which refers to rewarding core supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 
1986), and tactical redistribution, which aims to achieve electoral gains by 
targeting politically competitive regions around elections Dixit and Londregan 
(1996). “Patronage” involves awarding areas in which the incumbent party might 
enjoy strong support. Such constituencies would absorb a disproportionate 
amount of resources regardless of the electoral cycle. “Tactical redistribution” 
predicts that resources will be directed towards swing districts either to change 
the election outcome, in which case we are more likely to see an impact prior to 
the election, or rewarding the party’s strongholds, where one would expect to 
see a post-election impact. Our results pinpoint pre-election tactical 
redistribution over post-election rewarding or punishment of constituencies as 
the driver of the credit cycle, while we also find some evidence supporting the 
constant patronage argument during period further away from local elections. 
                                               
2 Nevertheless, we show below that our results extend to all provinces in the country in the vast 
majority of our analysis. 
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An important implication of our findings is that low frequency data may not be 
optimal to explore electoral cycles in bank lending, a point first made by 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) in the context of political budget cycles. 
We contribute to two strands of the literature. First, we provide new evidence on 
political cycles and mechanisms underlying tactical redistribution. Inspired by 
theories of opportunistic political cycles,3 earlier studies investigate the effect of 
elections on governments’ tax revenues and budget deficits.4 Evidence shows 
that such political budget cycles are prevalent across the world, especially in 
developing countries and young democracies (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 
2004; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2008). A more recent set of 
papers asks whether lending by state-owned banks follows a political cycle. Dinç 
(2005) finds cross-country evidence that government-owned banks raise lending 
in national election years compared with private banks. Cole (2009) finds that 
state banks in India extend more agricultural credit during election years, but 
with no tangible effect on agricultural output, especially in “swing” regions.5 
Similarly, Carvalho (2014) shows that Brazilian firms eligible for state-bank 
lending employ more people in politically attractive regions near elections and 
in return, these expansions are likely to be financed by state-bank loans. Most 
recently, Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) find that German savings banks, which 
                                               
3 See Nordhaus (1975), MacRae (1977) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988). 
4 These studies explore the possibility that politicians in power may use the central 
government’s fiscal muscles to boost the economy and improve their own reelection prospects. 
However, there is a chance that sophisticated voters might punish opportunistic governments 
as in Peltzman (1992), although this would require fully-informed voters with plenty of 
democratic experience (Brender and Drazen, 2005). 
5 Cole (2009) also finds that loan defaults increase after directed lending, which implies that 
election- induced loans are not used efficiently. 
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are subject to political influence, change their lending behaviour in the run up to 
local elections.  
In contrast to these studies, which uniformly find that political influence is used 
to expand credit to secure votes, we document how political power is associated 
with an aggregate reduction in credit.6 We document the drivers behind this 
reduction and the adverse effects that tactical redistribution creates on the real 
economy using data based on administrative records. The political lending cycle 
gives rise to aggregate financial constraints for firms located in politically 
misaligned regions, which respond by shedding jobs and assets, and suffer a 
decline in net sales. We do not find that firm entry is affected by these dynamics, 
which suggests that political lending operates through the intensive margin of 
firms. This is in line with a setting in which a central government may prefer 
enriching the (potentially connected) firms that already operate in allied regions 
while impoverishing (unconnected) firms located on the opposition side. We 
further document how politically induced lending targets firms and industries 
that are most able to create jobs, thereby confirming arguments from earlier 
studies that politicians have a particular interest in manipulating employment 
growth to help re-election chances. Finally, we show that such incentives are in 
turn compatible with constituents’ voting behaviour across local elections in our 
sample.  
Our second contribution to the literature is on how state-owned banks affect 
allocation of financial resources. While government ownership can help solve 
credit market failures that arise due to coordination problems or information 
asymmetries (Stiglitz, 1993), they could also end up serving the private interests 
                                               
6 Akey et al. (2017) document a similar negative association between political power and 
consumer credit in the U.S. 
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of the politicians and result in a misallocation of financial resources (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002). In a seminal paper, La Porta, 
Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) show that state ownership of the banking 
sector across countries is associated with lower levels of growth, financial 
development, and government efficiency. Sapienza (2004) uses loan-level data to 
find that Italian state banks charge lower interest rates to similar firms. This 
tendency strengthens as the political party associated with the state bank has 
more support in the region, implying financial favours for its supporters. 
Similarly, Khwaja and Mian (2005) present evidence that firms in Pakistan with 
a politician on their board benefit from lower rates and default more often when 
they borrow from government banks, but not from private ones.7  
Our paper contributes to this literature by quantifying the costs of politically 
induced lending. We find that tactical redistribution is not simply a minor cost 
of the democratic process, but it can be associated with substantial misallocation 
of financial resources and job losses. We show that tactical redistribution leads to 
the initially more efficient industries in misaligned regions to suffer the most 
from credit constraints. This implies that aggregate productivity in these regions 
is likely to suffer in the longer run as the relatively more efficient industries are 
forced to shed jobs and assets.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the recent history 
of the banking industry, institutional background, and politics in Turkey. Section 
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empirical methodology and results 
                                               
7 See also Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), who detect a negative relationship between political 
connect- edness of Indonesian firms and their foreign financing; this is consistent with the view 
that connected firms can obtain cheap financing from government banks and do not benefit 
from foreign financing. 
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on tactical reallocation of credit. Section 5 documents the real effects of politically 
induced lending. We conclude in Section 6.   
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 The Turkish Banking Sector 
The Turkish financial system is dominated by deposit-taking banks, which are 
the primary sources of funding in the economy as in other emerging markets. 
Both state-owned and private banks provide banking services through nation-
wide branch networks, and there are no local or regional banks. Banks primarily 
lend to corporates and households with no particular sectoral specialization, 
having left behind the episode of fiscal repression and funding government 
deficits of the 1980s and 1990s. During this earlier period, political interference 
was widespread in the banking system. For instance, during the coalition 
governments of 1990s, it was common practice to share control of state banks 
among coalition parties based on their vote shares (Önder and Özyıldırım, 2013).  
The shift in Turkish banking activity toward private sector financing followed an 
intensive restructuring phase, which was instigated by the twin currency and 
banking crises that struck the country between 1999 and 2001. More than 15 
banks failed during the episode and many were taken over by the country’s 
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). An extensive reform package was 
initiated under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
strengthen the operational efficiency and financial stability of the banking sector 
and to remove political interference. The central bank gained its institutional 
independence by law, while an independent Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established to solve the conflict of interest 
Lending Cycles 
 10 
problem in bank supervision.8 The BRSA was also given the sole right to issue 
new banking permits, which had been at the hands of the central government’s 
Council of Ministers and therefore heavily politicised. In early 2003, BRSA 
pushed through the early adoption of Basel II capital adequacy standards, and a 
limited deposit insurance scheme replaced the previously unlimited coverage for 
all financial institutions a year later.  
These reforms have undeniably improved the institutional quality of the Turkish 
banking sector, which escaped the global financial crisis of 2008-09 unscathed. 
They also arguably minimised government interference in banking, except via 
direct ownership. State authorities retain controlling shares in all three deposit-
taking state banks – Ziraatbank, Halkbank, and Vakıfbank –despite the fact that all 
three were initially aimed to be privatised as part of the restructuring 
programme. The IMF states explicitly in its 2002 Stand-By Agreement signed 
with Turkey that the government should “establish a common and politically 
independent board for Ziraat and Halk, reporting to the Treasury, and appoint 
new management who will apply commercial criteria to ensure profitability, and 
who will formulate privatization plans,” and “resume privatization process for 
Vakıf,” which had already contacted potential investors at the time.9  
                                               
8 Until 2000, the Treasury and the Central Bank shared the responsibility for bank supervision. 
These institutions were not able to step in to prevent the excessive carry-trade tendency when 
weakly-capitalised banks started financing Turkish government debt with cheap borrowing 
from abroad and exposed themselves to massive currency risks (see Baum et al., 2010). 
9 The full text of the 2002 stand-by agreement is available on IMF’s website: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2002/cr02136.pdf. There is a detailed appendix on 
banking reform, which reports on the progress: “The boards of the state banks were replaced by 
a joint board consisting of professional bankers with instructions to restructure their operations 
so as to bring them back to profitability and prepare them for eventual privatization. Direct 
political influences in the operations of the banks was thus dramatically reduced.” 
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Although both Halkbank and Vakıfbank eventually floated part of their shares via 
initial public offerings – Halk in 2007 and Vakıf in 2005 – the full privatisation of 
state banks did notmaterialiseinthecomingyears. 10  The IMF noted in a 2004 
consultation report: “Further restructuring and eventual privatization of the state 
banks was another focus of discussions, with many arguing that the initial 
momentum of reform had been lost.”11  The Turkish government has argued 
during this time that privatisation of state banks would undermine their social 
function, especially in relation to Ziraatbank. The IMF notes in 2007:12  
“State bank privatization would increase efficiency. After many 
delays, the IPO for 20–25 percent of the government’s share in 
Halkbank is underway. Staff urged that the residual government 
stake be sold within the next year and the privatization of Ziraat 
(the second largest deposit-taking institution) launched at once. 
The authorities, however, are reluctant to commit to specific plans, 
noting that Ziraat serves a social function as the only financial 
institution with branches in rural areas.”  
As noted earlier, the central government has maintained majority control of all 
three state banks during our sample period, which starts around the time that 
these reforms took effect. This constitutes an ideal period to investigate the 
                                               
10 The IPOs were far from smooth. For instance, although the privatisation of Halkbank was 
initially planned be carried out via the sale of a controlling stake, the plan was changed 
afterward and only around 25% of the bank’s shares went on offer. 
11 See Turkey: 2004 Article IV consultation: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05163.pdf. IMF further notes that “the due 
diligence of Vakıf has been further delayed”, while the Turkish authorities reiterate their 
commitment: “Our objective remains to privatize these banks [Halk and Ziraat] as soon as the 
restructuring is complete and when market conditions permit.” 
12 See Turkey: 2007 Article IV consultation: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07362.pdf. 
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influence of the central government on state-owned banks, as direct ownership – 
which the authorities retained despite earlier commitments to do otherwise – 
appears to be the only channel through which it can exert pressure on the 
banking system.  
Table 1 shows how deposit-taking banks in Turkey have evolved over the past 
two decades. Panel A indicates that the sector has shrunk in size considerably 
between 1999 and 2004 following the financial stability programme. In total 20 
banks were closed down, while state banks became much leaner by shedding 
branches and personnel.13  However, both state and private banks flourished 
since then, expanding their branch network and employees considerably. The 
sector consolidated on the private side through entry or mergers involving new 
and foreign banks. Panel B shows that the formation of a uniform supervisory 
and regulatory system levelled the playing field for private and state banks. State 
banks have substantially improved their loan quality and capital buffers since 
2004. More importantly, private and state banks have converged to a similar level 
of financial performance over time. This ensures that our identification strategy 
is immune to operational differences or balance sheet effects between these two 
sets of banks. State banks have retained an important role in the banking system 
as they typically control around a third of total banking assets, with similar 
market shares in both total deposits and lending.  
2.2 Politics and local elections in Turkey 
Turkey has been a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party political system 
during our sample period. The Prime Minister, typically the leader of a political 
                                               
13 Under the restructuring programme led by the IMF, 800 branches of Ziraat and Halk were 
closed and some 30,000 employees laid off. See IMF’s Turkey: 2004 Article IV Consultation. 
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coalition, served as the head of government and exercised executive powers with 
the Council of Ministers during our sample period of 2002-2017.14 The current 
ruling party, AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), has been in power since November 
2002 and retained its majority of seats in parliament through several general 
elections. The AKP inherited the IMF-led reforms of 1999-2001 and successfully 
implemented them, bringing public expenditures under control, strengthening 
the overall quality of institutions, and starting accession negotiations with the 
European Union in 2005.15  
Turkey is divided into 81 provinces (or cities) for administrative purposes, which 
are further divided into 923 districts.16 Each district corresponds to a constituency 
in a local election. Some of these districts jointly form the provincial center, which 
typically contains the largest population in a province. Out of the 81 provinces, 
30 are designated as metropolitan municipalities. A metropolitan municipality 
consists of all districts within the borders of that province, and a metropolitan 
mayor is elected by the majority of votes cast in that province.17  The electorate in 
metropolitan areas also votes for district mayors on the same election day. Voters 
in non-metropolitan areas only vote for mayoral candidates of the district they 
live in. The major contest among political parties is to have their candidate 
                                               
14 Turkey switched to an executive presidential system in June 2018, in which the electorate 
votes for the president alongside members of the parliament. The role of Prime Minister is 
abolished as a result. However, the structure of local governments is unaffected. 
15 See Acemoglu and Ucer (2015) for a discussion of Turkish politics and institutions under the 
AKP rule. 
16 Turkey follows EuroStat’s NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) designation 
for regions. There are 81 provinces at the NUTS-3 level, 26 subregions at the NUTS-2 level, and 
12 regions at the NUTS-1 level. 
17 As discussed below, this helps us have a better correspondence between election and credit 
data in metropolitan provinces. 
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elected as the metropolitan mayor in metropolitan provinces, and as the mayor 
of the central district in the remaining provinces.  
Local elections are held every five years on the same day throughout the country. 
Our sample period covers three local elections held in 2004, 2009, and 2014, at the 
end of March in each case.18 On the one hand, this means that we cannot exploit 
time variation across provinces in elections. On the other hand, it removes any 
bias from endogeneity of election timing, which may arise if early elections are 
called when the local economy is doing particularly well (Cole, 2009). Although 
early local elections are possible de jure in Turkey, de facto they do not exist in the 
country’s political culture. We focus on political cycles based on local, as opposed 
to general, elections to identify possible effects on bank lending and economic 
outcomes.19 The reasons for this are twofold.  
First, as Turkey gradually shifted from coalition governments to single-party 
governments over the past two decades, local elections have become more 
instrumental in expanding the power base of the ruling party. Mayors have 
become more visible in national politics, and some metropolitan municipalities 
have commanded substantial political clout.20 These developments are consistent 
with the political model of Brollo and Nannicini (2012), in which voters are 
unable to distinguish the sources of government transfers and political spillovers 
occur in favour of municipal governments. The central government may then use 
transfers to favour political friends or to punish political enemies at the local 
                                               
18 Exact election dates are 28 March 2004, 29 March 2009, and 30 March 2014. 
19 General elections are held in different years from local elections, and frequently called early 
by the central government opportunistically. There were four national elections in our sample 
period: 2007, 2011, 2015 (June), and 2015 (November). 
20 Indeed, current President Recep T. Erdoğan served as mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 
1998, before he set up the AKP that has ruled the country since 2002. See  İncioğlu (2002) and 
Sayarı (2014) for the rising importance of local elections in Turkey. 
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level, since mayoral candidates can be important allies for the central 
government once elected (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). In addition, the single-
party AKP government has rarely faced any competition at national elections 
during our sample period. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that any potential 
reallocation of resources should follow local elections, especially where the 
ruling party in central government faces real competition to “win” or “lose” 
certain provinces.  
Second, province-level vote shares of political parties at national elections do not 
translate directly into the number of seats gained in parliament, and thereby into 
political influence over resource transfers. This is due to the presence of a 
relatively high election threshold, which requires each political party to receive 
at least 10% of the national vote to enter the parliament. This makes it impossible 
to have a clear measure of the actual province- level electoral contest, since votes 
for parties that fail to clear the national threshold are redistributed among 
remaining parties in each province. The number of legislators that go to parties 
with at least 10% of the national vote are artificially increased as a result. We 
believe that such uncertainty regarding the number of legislative seats that can 
be won at the province level deters the central government from pursuing a 
regional targeting policy. 21  In contrast, competition in a local election is 
straightforward to quantify and more visible as it resembles a single-winner 
voting system, in which the party that gets the most votes wins the constituency. 
Therefore, our focus on local elections helps us understand tactical reallocation 
                                               
21 Baum et al. (2010) check for parliamentary election cycles in the Turkish banking sector from 
1963 to 2007 and find no evidence of a meaningful difference between state and private banks. 
This could be due to two possible reasons. Either governments do not resort to such tactics for 
general elections, or political influence also affects private banks, as it is commonly believed to 
have been the case before 2001. 
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by the central government when it faces a clear competitive threat to win or lose 
a province.  
3. Data 
We use three main data sets in our analysis. Our first data set combines detailed 
banking information from the FinTürk database maintained by Turkey’s Banking 
Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA). FinTürk provides province-level 
data at the quarterly frequency on both corporate and consumer loans extended 
by state, private domestic, and foreign banks beginning in the fourth quarter of 
2007. These data constitute the universe of bank cash and non-cash loans in the 
country, include data on non-performing loans (NPLs), and cover all provinces 
by bank type. We also collect data on bank branches and deposits from FinTürk, 
again at the level of province and bank type. Separately, FinTürk provides a 
breakdown of corporate lending nationally by bank type and industry of 
borrower (following the EU’s NACE Rev. 2) at a monthly frequency since 2005. 
We use this piece of information to construct credit market shares by bank type.  
Our second dataset contains measures of real economic outcomes from firm-level 
administrative records. The Turkish Ministry of Industry (MoI) maintains a 
centralised database that collates various firm-level data sets that are collected by 
multiple public institutions and agencies.22 Researchers can submit information 
requests to the ministry to obtain data aggregated at a higher level than the most 
detailed level of the firm. For our purposes, we submitted multiple requests and 
obtained data sourced from the balance sheets and income statements of every 
                                               
22 This centralised database is called Giris¸imci Bilgi Sistemi (GBS) in Turkish. See 
https://gbs.sanayi.gov.tr/GbsHakkinda.aspx for a list of the public institutions contributing 
data, available data sets, terms of access, and sample reports. 
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firm that is formally registered in the country.23 Specifically, we obtained the 
following variables aggregated at the 2-digit industry (following NACE Rev. 2), 
province, and year level using end-of-year documents: employment, net sales, 
total assets, short-term bank debt, and long-term bank debt. In addition, we 
obtained figures for the total number of establishments underlying these 
variables. These data essentially capture the universe of corporate activity in the 
country.  
Our third data set consists of local election outcomes. We obtain information on 
district- and metropolitan-level votes for each political party from TurkStat. 
Based on these data, we create two political variables. The first is a measure of 
political competition (or contestedness) that captures the margin of victory/loss 
by the ruling-party (“allied”) candidate against the most popular opposition 
(“non-allied”) candidate. Formally, we start by con- structing a continuous 
Competition variable: Competition variable: Competitionp,t = 1 − |M arginp,t|, 
where p stands for province, t indicates the particular election, and Margin 
denotes the difference in the share of votes won by the ruling party’s candidate 
and the most popular opposition candidate. Thus, Competition takes values 
between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicating close electoral competition. To 
capture province-level competition, we work with the margin in the election of 
metropolitan mayors in metropolitan areas. For non-metropolitan areas, we use 
the corresponding value for the central district of the province.  
One might worry that electoral contestedness is influenced by the lending 
behaviour of state-owned banks in the province, which might render Competition 
                                               
23 The MoI sources firm-level balance sheets and income statements from Turkey’s Department 
of Revenue Administration (the equivalent body in the United States is the Internal Revenue 
Service). It sources employment information from Turkey’s Social Security Institution (the 
equivalent body in the United States is Social Security Administration). 
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potentially endogenous. Earlier studies have dealt with this issue by using a 
binary variable for political competition. We follow earlier studies in this regard 
and define an indicator variable of electoral competition. In particular, this 
dummy variable, Compp,t, equals 1 when the variable Competition is above its 
sample median and 0 otherwise. We show below that our results are qualitatively 
unchanged when using either a continuous measure of contestedness or several 
other variants.  
Our second political variable is a dummy for political alignment (or alliance), 
which indicates whether the ruling-party candidate wins (i.e., gets the highest 
number of votes) in that province or not. Recall that voters elect both district and 
metropolitan mayors in metropolitan provinces, while they elect only a district 
mayor in non-metropolitan provinces. However, our credit data are only 
available at the province level, which means that we need to aggregate voting 
outcomes to define a province-level measure of alignment. Previous literature 
deals with this problem by averaging voting outcomes across constituencies of a 
region (for instance, see Cole (2009)). However, this approach may be 
inappropriate in our setting. Unlike most previous studies, in which political 
pressure is applied by local governments on local state banks, our setting predicts 
political influence by the central government on national state banks. Thus, tactical 
reallocation not only depends on electoral competition in a province, but also 
crucially on whether the province is currently aligned with the ruling party in 
central government or not.24 This forces us to have a cleaner measure of alliance 
than averaging across districts.  
                                               
24 Alliance with the central or federal government does not matter in the political settings of 
Sapienza (2004), Cole (2009) or Englmaier and Stowasser (2017), where locally elected 
governments have a direct influence on state banks that operate locally. Carvalho (2014) has a 
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We tackle this problem by concentrating on the metropolitan mayors and, in non- 
metropolitan provinces, on the central district mayors. This gives us a direct 
measure of alliance for each province. However, this procedure is still not ideal 
for non-metropolitan provinces, since some central districts – even though they 
are the largest by population within a province – do not always represent the 
political dynamics of the whole province. This can be seen in Figure 1, which 
shows the alliance of elected district mayors in two non-metropolitan provinces 
during 2004 elections. Panel A shows that in Mu ̧s, the only aligned district was 
the central district, where the electorate represented less than half of all voters 
(48.3%) in that province. In contrast, the central district in Kastamonu (Panel B) 
was not aligned with the ruling party; however, a large portion of the province 
(43.9% by votes) was still governed by an aligned mayor. If politically induced 
lending occurs at the level of districts, this may create some measurement error 
and lead to attenuation bias in our estimates. We therefore base our main 
findings on results from metropolitan provinces, where the elected mayor 
represents the whole electorate and acts as the main political figure in the 
province.25 Our estimates from the metropolitan sample should thus be free of 
measurement error. Nevertheless, we will also report our findings from a full 
sample that also includes non-metropolitan provinces.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis. During 
our sample period, 60% of provinces on average are classified as politically 
                                               
setting similar to ours, in which the central government in Brazil manipulates state-bank 
lending to help reelect allied state governors. 
25 Given the rising importance of metropolitan mayors in the Turkish political sphere and that 
the vast majority of economic activity takes place in metropolitan provinces, the central 
government is more likely to strategically target them. For instance, 85% of total lending by 
state banks and 95% of total lending by private banks is concentrated in metropolitan provinces 
on average during our sample period. 
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aligned with the ruling party. There is a fair degree of electoral competition, as 
the win margin in the median province is 14 percentage points. Figure 2 shows 
the level of political competition and mayors’ alignment with the governing 
party for metropolitan provinces based on voting outcomes for each local 
election. Darker tones indicate greater electoral contestedness, which has 
increased throughout the sample period, and different colours for the governing 
and opposition parties indicate that around a half of metropolitan provinces are 
politically aligned. It is this variation in local political competition and alignment 
that we exploit in our identification strategy. 
4. Political Lending Cycles 
4.1 Identification Strategies 
We start with a simple difference-in-differences (DD) methodology in a balanced 
panel set- ting to investigate political cycles. We use government ownership of 
banks as our treatment, which captures political influence by the central 
government over local lending. Our control group includes all privately-owned 
banks that operate in the same provinces (i.e. we aggregate lending by domestic 
private and foreign banks). If there is politically induced lending, then political 
pressure on state-owned banks should intensify around election years. We 
therefore expect state banks to alter their lending behaviour closer to elections 
compared with private banks. To the extent that the effect of politicians on 
lending decisions by state banks is stable over time, or that politicians also 
influence lending by private banks around elections, our DD estimates provide a 
lower bound for the true size of politically induced lending. 
The essence of DD relies on the premise that treated and untreated groups share 
a parallel trend in the absence of treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Figure 3 
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shows the evolution of total cash loans extended by state and private banks in 
the top panel. Aggregate credit has been on a stable trajectory for both types of 
banks throughout this period. Exceptions to these trends appear in 2009 and 
2016, when lending by private banks have actually contracted due to significant 
slowdowns in the Turkish economy.26 This has further increased state banks’ 
market share of aggregate lending, which has been on an upward trajectory 
during the sample period. Importantly, however, the bottom panel of Figure 3 
shows that this long-run trend has been similar across all provinces regardless of 
their political alignment or degree of electoral competition. 
Our DD strategy should be immune to year-specific shocks to the extent that 
economic fluctuations affect all provinces or bank types similarly. Nevertheless, 
we carry out extensive checks to ensure that no single election or unobserved 
province- or bank type-specific shocks drive our results. Moreover, we include 
the number of local branches by bank type in each of our regressions. This should 
help us control for any long-term credit demand and supply conditions in each 
province by bank type, and potential sorting of banks that may be linked to 
regional unobservables. 
As discussed before, we mainly search for tactical redistribution prior to elections 
in our context while still being to open to the possibility of patronage in non-
election years. To test this idea, we make use of the full time-series and cross-
sectional dimensions of our dataset. Formally, we adopt a triple difference-in-
differences (DDD) model and test whether highly contested provinces get 
more/less credit from state banks around elections when compared with private 
banks. The DDD model allows us to control for a full set of province-by-year or 
                                               
26 Turkey experienced a recession in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, while growth slowed 
down in 2016 due to political uncertainty induced by a failed coup attempt in July. 
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bank type-by-year fixed effects. This helps us eliminate any unobserved 
province- or bank-specific shocks that may be correlated with election cycles. 
A key feature of our identification comes from the fact that we test the differential 
allocation of state-bank credit towards swing provinces over the entire election 
cycle instead of only comparing election versus non-election years. This gives us 
a full picture of the evolution of political pressure on state-banks, and provides a 
much more powerful test of election-induced lending. In fact, bank credit cycles 
over time could be explained by reasons unrelated to politics (such as banks’ 
different sensitivities to policy uncertainty). Cross- sectional allocation of credit 
towards certain provinces could be related to province-specific factors (such as 
concentration of certain sectors in certain provinces). However, it is difficult to 
explain why such cross-sectional relationships would vary over time specifically 
around elections without resorting to an explanation based on political incentives 
(Cole, 2009). We return to this discussion below after we present our main results. 
4.2 Is there an election cycle in state-bank credit? 
We start by testing whether state banks adjust their overall lending behaviour 
around elections compared with private banks using a standard DD model. 
Consider: 
LogCreditb,p,t = βτ StateBankb × Electiont+τ + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t  (1) 
where b is an index for bank type, p stands for province, and t denotes year-
quarters in the quarterly data. The dependent variable, LogCreditb,p,t, is total cash 
loans (in logs). StateBankb is a dummy variable indicating state-owned banks. 
Electiont equals 1 in the quarter that a local election takes place and the preceding 
three quarters, and 0 otherwise. This gives us a precisely estimated pre-election 
effect. 
Bircan & Saka 
 23 
The main advantage of working with quarterly data is that we can pinpoint 
exactly how state banks alter their lending behaviour before and after elections. 
We therefore extend our analysis to the whole cycle by employing a rolling 
definition of Electiont+τ, where τ corresponds to the quarters before and after 
elections. For instance, Electiont−2 equals 1 for two to six quarters prior to an 
election, and 0 otherwise. τ takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number 
of quarters around elections and thereby capturing the full election cycle 
spanning five years. 
Our coefficient of interest in equation (1) is βτ and captures the behaviour of state 
banks compared with private banks at each point over the election cycle. We 
include fixed effects at the levels of bank type, province, and time in our baseline. 
These capture any unobservable and time invariant factors related to bank types 
and individual provinces, and aggregate shocks in that quarter. Lastly, Xb,p,t−1 
includes the lagged presence of bank branches, which control for local market 
shares separately for each bank-type.27 We cluster standard errors in all of our 
regressions at the province level, since local credit outcomes are likely to be 
correlated across time within localities. 
Table 3 presents results in the immediate run up to a local election (i.e., τ = 0) for 
the sample of metropolitan provinces in columns (1)-(4) and for the full sample 
in columns (5)-(8). In both samples and across different sets of controls, state 
banks reduce lending in the four quarters up to and including elections when 
compared with private banks. This is the case even when time trends are 
                                               
27 We observe the number of bank branches by province and bank type, but control for their 
presence using an ordinal variable by assigning them into 30 groups. This is because the 
number of bank branches itself might be affected by the local election cycles we are trying to 
identify, giving rise to a “bad control” problem (Englmaier and Stowasser, 2017). We show in 
Section 4.5 that our results are robust to different definitions of covariates. 
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included by province (columns (3) and (7)) or when a full set of province-by-time 
factors are non-parametrically controlled for (columns (4) and (8)). In the latter 
case, all relevant local shocks to credit demand such as unemployment or growth 
are absorbed, and our coefficient estimates hardly differ from alternative 
specifications. Point estimates range from -7.5% in the full sample to -14.6% in 
the metropolitan sample; all coefficients are estimated with a high level of 
statistical significance and point to a substantial reduction in lending by state 
banks relative to private banks. 
Figure 4 plots coefficients for the entire election cycle from regressions that 
include our baseline controls and province time trends. Each plotted coefficient 
corresponds to a single regression with an estimate of βτ as τ varies between -10 
and +10. Hence, coefficient estimates for τ = 0 in Panels A and B equal estimates 
reported in columns (3) and (7), respectively, of Table 3.28 Lending by state banks 
hits rock bottom compared with private banks either in the quarter in which 
elections take place or just before. In metropolitan provinces, state-bank credit 
hits a trough at -12.5% one quarter before local elections, while it hits a trough at 
-7.5% in the election quarter in the full sample. This negative effect is estimated 
with precision in the four quarters leading up to the election and persists for 
another four to five quarters following it. These findings clearly illustrate that 
state bank credit is subject to a cycle around local elections. State banks reduce 
their lending prior to local elections and boost it afterwards compared with 
private banks. 
This finding may at first seem counter-intuitive, since most earlier studies 
document a rise in state-bank lending in the run up to elections. There are two 
                                               
28 Our regressions for the full election cycle presented in figures below always include province 
time trends. 
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reasons why earlier findings and ours actually complement, rather than 
contradict, each other. First, our focus is on local election cycles rather than 
general elections that have been studied by previous literature (Dinç, 2005). In 
local elections, a central government’s control over state banks leads to different 
incentives across provinces depending on their political attractiveness (Brollo 
and Nannicini, 2012; Carvalho, 2014). Therefore, local elections do not necessarily 
imply an overall pre-election credit boom in the country. Second, earlier studies 
that investigate local elections and bank credit typically have political settings in 
which local governments are in direct control of local state banks (Cole, 2009; 
Englmaier and Stowasser, 2017). In that case, each local government would have 
an incentive to encourage pre-election lending to increase their re-election 
prospects, and thus there would be an overall credit boom in the country before 
elections. However, our political pressure channel goes from central government 
to state banks, which predicts a reallocation of credit across provinces but does 
not necessitate a rise in aggregate lending. 
Although we find evidence that state banks’ lending behaviour changes around 
elections, it is important to note that such intertemporal reallocation does not 
strictly imply political manipulation. It is possible that state banks are more 
sensitive than private banks to overall political uncertainty induced by local 
elections. As a result they may choose to postpone lending decisions until after 
elections take place. Since we document a recovery in state-bank lending a few 
quarters after elections, we do not yet rule out this possibility. 
4.3 Is there tactical redistribution across provinces? 
We now test the existence of political incentives behind the intertemporal 
reallocation of state-bank credit over the local election cycle. Note that 
redistributing credit is not costless and that the central government’s incentive to 
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distort bank policies increases with the marginal utility of receiving additional 
votes (Englmaier and Stowasser, 2017). Undoubtedly, this marginal utility is 
highest where a small number of votes can determine the outcome; that is, in 
closely contested elections. We should therefore find stronger reallocation of 
credit in provinces with high electoral competition if the election-induced cycle 
is driven (at least partly) by political goals. To test this idea, we extend Equation 
(1) to a triple difference-in-differences model as follows: 
LogCreditb,p,t = βτ Compp,t × StateBankb × Electiont+τ + α1Compp,t × StateBankb 
+ α2StateBankb × Electiont+τ + α3Compp,t × Electiont+τ 
+ α4Compp,t + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t (2) 
where Compp,t represents the binary competition variable created earlier. As 
discussed in Section 3, our measures of political variables are most reliable for 
metropolitan provinces. We will therefore present our tactical redistribution 
results based on this sample. 
Notice that Compp,t is time-varying and we need to make an assumption on 
political contestedness for non-election quarters. We follow the literature in 
assuming that competition for the next two-and-a-half years (or ten quarters) 
after an election is captured by the previous election outcome, while it is captured 
by an upcoming election outcome for the two-and-a-half years before an election 
in that constituency (Cole, 2009; Englmaier and Stowasser, 2017). Despite the 
aforementioned endogeneity concern between credit as a dependent variable and 
competition as an independent variable in Equation (2), we believe it is 
reasonable to assume that political redistribution of credit would not change 
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election outcomes by such a high margin as to make an election uncompetitive.29 
We therefore show in Section 4.5 below that our results are robust to a number 
of alternative definitions of political competition. 
Our main coefficient of interest in Equation (2) is the triple-interaction effect 
denoted by βτ. It captures the impact of greater political competition in a province 
on the difference between state-bank and private-bank lending in the quarters 
running up to an election (τ = 0). The two-way interactions underlying the triple 
effect absorb economically important effects and are also of interest. Based on the 
discussion in Section 4.1, α1 accounts for the possibility that state banks may 
differ in their local lending behaviour depending on the political attractiveness 
of a province independent of an election cycle. Similarly, α2 captures any election-
induced effects that may differ between the two types of banks, while α3 accounts 
for any responses to elections that may vary across provinces based on political 
attractiveness but not bank types. Hence, the model captures any shocks to banks 
or provinces that may be correlated with either the electoral cycle or the degree 
of contestedness in an election. We will saturate this model further by a full set 
of province-time and bank-time fixed effects to capture all time-varying and 
province- or bank-specific unobservable shocks. 
A central government’s incentives to redistribute resources across provinces 
depends not only on political attractiveness, but also on whether the incumbent 
mayor is a political ally or not. In particular, if a province is currently ruled by a 
mayor from the ruling party, then the central government has an interest in 
increasing voter appreciation and the re-election chances of the incumbent 
                                               
29 This does not mean that the central government would not be able to win an election by 
manipulating credit. It means that any extra lending allocated to a province through state banks 
would not be able to change the nature of the election, making it competitive or uncompetitive. 
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mayor. However, the opposite would be true if a mayor from opposition is 
currently in charge. It is thus optimal from the central government’s perspective 
to increase credit and positively influence economic conditions in politically 
aligned provinces, and to decrease credit and reduce economic activity in non-
aligned provinces. Therefore, we divide our sample into two subsamples based 
on current mayoral incumbency and condition our expectations of βτ on political 
alliance. If tactical redistribution exists, we expect βτ > 0 in aligned provinces and 
βτ < 0 in non-aligned provinces just prior to the elections. As for the constant 
patronage argument, we would expect the central government to favour its strong 
supporters (i.e. less competitive areas) in allied provinces and more competitive 
areas in non-allied provinces during non-election times. Hence, we would expect 
βτ to switch its sign further away from elections (for very low or high values of 
τ). 
Table 4 shows estimates of Equation (2) when τ = 0 on a sample of metropolitan 
provinces, for which our identification strategy is cleanest. In line with a tactical 
redistribution mechanism, state banks lend more in provinces with higher 
political contestedness and an aligned incumbent mayor (i.e., βτ > 0 in columns 
(1)-(5)), while they significantly reduce credit in provinces with higher political 
contestedness but ruled by an opposition mayor (i.e., βτ < 0 in columns (6)-(10)) 
when compared with private banks. We report estimates in each sub-sample 
with varying degrees of saturation in our fixed effects and find especially strong 
results in non-aligned provinces. Our point estimates are unchanged but 
estimated with less precision when we include the full set of province-time and 
bank-time fixed effects. In the four quarters immediately before a local election 
takes place, state banks are estimated to increase their lending by around 13% 
compared with private banks in con- tested areas with an aligned mayor, but 
reduce it by around 9% in contested areas with a non-aligned mayor. These 
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effects are sizable given that our credit measure covers the entire state-bank 
lending in a province. They are also comparable to results by Cole (2009), who 
finds that state banks increase agricultural lending by 5-10 percentage points in 
an election year. 
Figure 5 illustrates the presence of tactical reallocation over the full election cycle 
by plotting coefficient estimates of the triple-interaction term (βτ) for different 
values of τ.30  Targeted redistribution starts around four quarters prior to an 
election, and is strongest in the immediate run up to it. There is strong evidence 
in the bottom panel that politically non- aligned provinces suffer from a relative 
reduction in lending by state banks for an extended period in the run up to 
closely contested elections. We see the exact opposite trend in the top panel of 
politically aligned provinces. There is also some support for the constant 
patronage hypothesis as βτ switches signs when the central government does not 
have electoral concerns but would rather favour areas where it faces stronger 
support in general, although this effect is not always statistically significant. 
We believe that this visual representation of state-bank credit reallocation over 
the election cycle provides strong evidence of political incentives behind state-
bank lending. There could be alternative explanations for why state banks in 
general would behave differently around elections. For instance, state banks may 
be more cautious in their lending in provinces with greater political uncertainty. 
However, this would imply that state banks should cut back on lending in all 
politically contested provinces regardless of the alignment of incumbent mayors, 
which is at odds with the evidence. There could also be reasons why certain 
provinces get a higher share of state-bank loans than others. State banks may 
                                               
30 The exact model used for the estimates shown in the figure includes our baseline controls and 
province time trends as in Columns (3) and (8) in Table 4. 
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specialise in lending to certain industries and unobserved shocks to these 
industries may drive part of the lending cycle. However, such effects should be 
captured by our full set of province-by-time fixed effects, whose inclusion leaves 
our main estimates unchanged. It is difficult to explain why cross-sectional 
relationships would vary in different directions based on local political 
alignment and exactly prior to local elections. 
In order to shed more light on political incentives, we explore the channels 
through which the central government engages in tactical redistribution. Our 
aggregate credit data can be broken down by lending to different segments of the 
economy. This allows us to test whether targeted lending occurs in certain 
segments but not others, which helps us understand what voters respond to. On 
the one hand, politicians may try to induce a quick and direct impact on voters 
by raising their instant consumption. Healy and Lenz (2014) find that voters 
judge U.S. presidential candidates on the election-year economy because this is 
the most immediately available metric to them for judging a president’s 
performance. However, given that province mayors have no direct control over 
bank credit supply in Turkey, it is difficult to argue that a change in consumer 
loans would have a direct impact on consumers’ perception about the incumbent 
mayor. 
On the other hand, politicians may be tempted to use bank credit to boost or 
contain corporate activity in a region. This would be more likely to influence 
voting patterns if corporates have a say in local politics and voters – at least partly 
– attribute corporates’ economic outcomes to local politicians. For instance, 
Carvalho (2014) finds evidence in line with this view and shows that the central 
government in Brazil provides favourable credit to firms in politically aligned 
regions, who in turn expand employment to increase the re-election chances of 
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incumbents. Although the consumer and corporate channels are not mutually 
exclusive, we expect the latter to be dominant in the Turkish political setting 
given its similarity to that of Brazil. 
Figure 6 plots estimates of Equation (2) separately for corporate and consumer 
loans for different values of τ. Panel A confirms our expectation that tactical 
redistribution is mainly targeted at corporate loans. The estimates are sizable and 
statistically significant for both aligned and non-aligned provinces in the case of 
corporate loans. The positive impact in aligned provinces peaks precisely in the 
election quarter, while the negative impact in non- aligned provinces hits the 
bottom one quarter prior to the election. There is also evidence that these patterns 
reverse in periods away from elections, supporting the notion that the central 
government might be pursuing patronage in those quarters. In contrast, 
estimates for consumer loans presented in panel B are uniformly insignificant 
and show no visible pattern around elections. These patterns are consistent with 
a setting in which political lending is channelled to segments of an economy 
where it could signal business skills for the incumbent mayor. 
Does tactical redistribution of credit operate through state banks’ existing clients 
or at the margin? Unfortunately our data do not allow us to observe how lending 
to the marginal borrower adjusts over time. We therefore adopt an indirect 
approach and estimate Equation (2) with NPLs as a share of total cash loans on 
the left hand side. If banks grant loans to applicants successively based on credit 
quality and state banks adjust lending to the marginal borrower prior to an 
election, then we would expect post-election default rates on loans to differ 
between state and private banks. Figure 7 shows the election cycle in share of 
NPLs. While there does not appear to be a clear cycle in politically aligned 
provinces, we find a strong drop in the share of NPLs in state bank portfolios in 
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non-aligned provinces up to six quarters following a local election. As the 
average maturity of loans in Turkey lies between one and two years, this timing 
in default rates is consistent with state banks cutting back on lending to the 
marginal borrowers in non-aligned provinces. 
Our results show that the central government’s reallocation of state-bank credit 
targets firms’ credit access and aims to influence local economic and voting 
outcomes through the corporate channel. State banks seem to increase the 
volume of credit to existing clients in politically aligned provinces, which is 
consistent with these firms being politically connected, but reduce it at the 
margin and also possibly for existing clients in non-aligned provinces. This leads 
us to investigate the effects of such redistribution on economic activity, and how 
changes in activity affect voter preferences, in Section 5. 31  Before we do so, 
however, we document this political lending cycle over a longer time period, 
present robustness checks, and discuss alternative mechanisms underlying our 
findings. 
4.4 Testing for the lending cycle in yearly data 
We use quarterly data for our baseline estimations, which allow us to 
differentiate between pre- and post-election effects. In this sub-section, we 
alternatively use annual bank credit data provided by the Turkish central bank 
to check whether a lending cycle exists in the longer term. These data provide the 
year-end total cash loan exposure of each bank type across all provinces from 
2003 to 2017. Hence, we can utilise additional variation due to the local elections 
that took place in 2004. We re-estimate Equation (1) with these yearly data, where 
                                               
31 We will show in Section 5 that politically induced lending indeed affects corporates’ credit 
constraints, which respond by adjusting their employment, and that voter support for 
incumbent mayors reacts to changes in local employment. 
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τ now refers to years around local elections. Electiont now equals 1 in the year 
before a local election, and 0 otherwise. Since all three local elections are held in 
March, this definition ensures that we capture a pre-election rather than a post-
election effect in the yearly regressions. 
Results are in Appendix A. In line with our earlier findings from quarterly data, 
Table A.1 shows that state banks reduce their lending in the year just before a 
local election when compared with private banks. Estimates suggest that state-
bank lending is between 12.5% and 17.5% lower compared with private-bank 
lending in election years. In Table A.2, we show that this result is not driven by 
a particular local election in our sample period. That is, we re-run our regressions 
each time dropping one election cycle at a time and confirm that our results are 
qualitatively unchanged across different samples. Figure A.1 shows results for 
the full election cycle from regressions that include our baseline controls and 
province time trends. Each plotted coefficient corresponds to a single regression 
with an estimate of βτ when τ is equal to -2, -1, 0, +1 or +2. The figure shows that 
state banks curb credit with respect to private banks in an election year. 
However, they increase lending on a larger scale than private banks directly 
afterwards. This cycle seems slightly stronger in metropolitan provinces than in 
our full sample. 
To test for the presence of tactical redistribution over a longer period, we re-
estimate Equation 2 with yearly data.32 We confirm in Table A.3 that politically 
aligned provinces benefit from a relative rise in credit supply by state banks 
when elections are closely con- tested, while non-aligned provinces suffer from a 
relative reduction. Our yearly regressions of tactical reallocation return estimates 
                                               
32 We report results on a sample of metropolitan provinces, for which our identification strategy 
is cleanest. 
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that are higher than our quarterly estimates, and they are also estimated with 
greater statistical precision. Figure A.2 reports yearly estimates for the full 
election cycle. In provinces that are politically aligned with the ruling party, state 
banks lend more than private banks in the election year especially when political 
competition is high, and this effect persists in the post-election period. In non-
aligned provinces, the drop in state-bank lending in the election year similarly 
persists one year after the election before recovering. These findings suggest that 
the central government may continue its tactical redistribution even after 
elections by rewarding constituencies in which it narrowly won, and punishing 
regions in which it narrowly lost elections. Consistent with the view that the 
central government favours its strongholds in the absence of election concerns, 
βτ switches signs as it moves further away from local elections. 
4.5 Robustness checks 
We carry out a number of robustness checks, which are all reported in Appendix 
B. As tactical redistribution of state-bank credit appears to be concentrated on the 
corporate sector, we carry out these exercises using corporate loans as our 
dependent variable using quarterly data. In unreported results, we confirm for 
each exercise that there is no political lending cycle in consumer loans.33 We 
report estimates of βτ in Equation (2) including baseline controls and province 
time trends for the full election cycle for each of the following exercises. 
As a first round of checks, we re-estimate Equation (2) with alternative 
definitions of political contestedness, Compp,t. In our baseline definition, our 
competition dummy takes the value of 1 for the upper 50% of the continuous 
                                               
33 We have also conducted each set of our robustness checks with annual data, which are 
available upon request. 
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competition variable in the pooled sample of province-years, and 0 otherwise. 
Defining the competition dummy alternatively as the upper 25% of the 
continuous variable (Figure B.1), using the 50% cut-off for each election one at a 
time (Figure B.2), or simply using the continuous competition variable itself 
(Figure B.3) all return qualitatively identical results. Furthermore, results remain 
similar when we measure political competition at a local election using the 
previous election’s outcomes (Figure B.4). 
In a second round of checks, we employ alternative controls in Xb,p,t−1 in Equation 
(2). Our baseline control of bank branches is an ordinal variable of 30 ranked 
clusters because branch presence itself might be affected by the local election 
cycles we are trying to identify. Our results remain unchanged when we instead 
control for bank branches in continuous log form (Figure B.5), or customer 
deposits alternatively (Figure B.6). Customer deposits are arguably less of a bad 
control if the central government has less influence over its distribution in 
provinces, but more so if customers adjust their deposits with the election cycle, 
for instance due to flight to safety when political uncertainty is high. 
In a third round of checks, we confirm that our results are not driven by the 
biggest cities in the sample or one of the three local elections. In particular, 
dropping the three largest metropolitan cities – Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir 
(Figure B.7) – or dropping one local election at a time in our yearly regressions 
(Figure B.8) does not alter our qualitative results. 
Finally, we account for the possibility that our reference group in our estimations 
may contain some heterogeneity in itself. In particular, our baseline estimates 
merge domestic private and foreign banks into a single private category. 
However, recent research suggests that private banks are also subject to political 
pressure (Akey et al., 2017; Chavaz and Rose, 2018). In our context, one may 
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conjecture that domestic private banks are also subject to the central 
government’s political influence, and foreign banks less so. We therefore exclude 
all lending by foreign banks and simply treat domestic private bank lending as 
our reference category as a check. If domestic private banks are also subject to 
the central government’s political influence, then estimates from this robustness 
check should be biased downward. We do not find this to be the case (Figure 
B.9). In fact, estimates are often larger than our baseline, suggesting that possible 
political pressure on domestic private banks is unlikely to affect our results. 
4.6 Additional mechanisms 
Our results so far are consistent with a supply-side story of state-owned banks 
actively adjusting their lending practices in provinces with closely contested local 
elections. Two pieces of evidence lend credibility to this interpretation. First, our 
results on tactical redistribution are immune to the inclusion of province-time 
fixed effects, using alternative control variables, and estimations on different sub-
samples. Unobservable demand factors are therefore unlikely to drive our 
findings. Second, state-owned banks appear to adjust their lending precisely in a 
way that may help increase electoral support for politically aligned incumbent 
mayors and decrease it for non-aligned mayors. Nevertheless, we explore three 
alternative explanations that may arise from the demand side. 
First, we explore the importance of political uncertainty for the supply of bank 
credit and how this varies by bank type. A rich body of work documents that 
firms and households delay or cut back on investment and borrowing in the face 
of political uncertainty.34 A challenge to this argument is that uncertainty should 
                                               
34 See for instance Julio and Yook (2012); Gulen and Ion (2015); Jens (2017); Di Maggio et al. 
(2017). 
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affect corporate decision-making similarly in both aligned and non-aligned 
provinces. That is, we would expect both state-owned and private banks to see a 
reduction in their lending volumes in provinces with the greatest electoral 
competition regardless of the incumbent mayor’s alignment. We therefore 
estimate the following DD model: 
LogCreditb,p,t = βτ HIp,t × Electiont+τ + α1HIp,t + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t (3) 
where HIp,t is an indicator variable for the upper half of a Herfindahl index of 
local political competition and proxies uncertainty.35 Figure B.10 in Appendix B 
shows no evidence at all – from regressions on either quarterly (panel A) or 
yearly (panel B) data – that political uncertainty is associated with a change in 
lending at any point of the election cycle. 
We push this line of inquiry further to tease out whether state banks are 
particularly vulnerable to political uncertainty. If state banks tend to work 
relatively more with firms that have greater sensitivity to local politics, then they 
may cut back on lending prior to an election as a result of reduced credit demand 
by such firms.36 We therefore estimate the following DDD model: 
  
                                               
35 The Herfindahl index for electoral competition is defined as: 1 − ∑ (%&'()ℎ+,(-,/,0)2-∈4 , where 
VoteSharei,p,t denotes each political party’s vote share in province p and time t. We use a dummy 
variable instead of the continuous index to guard against the possibility that credit reallocation 
might affect political uncertainty. 
36 Note that we would be under-estimating the impact of politically induced lending in 
politically aligned provinces if state banks indeed lend more cautiously prior to politically 
uncertain elections. 
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LogCreditb,p,t = βτ HIp,t × StateBankb × Electiont+τ + α1HIp,t × StateBankb 
+ α2StateBankb × Electiont+τ + α3HIp,t × Electiont+τ 
+ α4HIp,t + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t (4) 
Figure B.11 shows that βτ is estimated with a negative, but statistically 
insignificant, sign in the quarters leading up to a local election in panel A. This 
suggests that while state banks may indeed be more cautious prior to local 
elections, there is not sufficient evidence that political uncertainty would explain 
our findings. Results from yearly data in panel B similarly show no such 
evidence. 
Second, we explore whether there are other demand factors correlated with the 
election cycle. In particular, the behaviour of private firms and banks can be 
politically influenced if they benefit from public funds (Carvalho, 2014; Chavaz 
and Rose, 2018). It is possible that the central government engages in a re-
allocation of public contracts, investment or funds around local elections that 
favour its allies and punishes opponents. To the extent that firms receiving these 
public funds use state bank credit relatively more, this could give rise to a lending 
cycle that is induced by firm-level demand. 
To test this particular mechanism, we put together two new databases from 
publicly available data. The first database contains investment incentives issued 
by the central government from 2003 onwards. These incentives are administered 
by the Ministry of Economy and constitute Turkey’s main investment promotion 
programme.37 They are available to both foreign and domestic investors through 
                                               
37 The government maintains a website in English and provides details on this scheme here: 
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/Incentives.aspx 
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an “Investment Incentive Certificate”, which is obtained from the Ministry 
following an evaluation of the investment project. Recipients are published in the 
Official Gazette every month alongside the amount of their proposed investment, 
number of jobs they promise to create, and the particular incentives they are 
entitled to receive based on the region of investment. Over the 2003-2017 period, 
a total of 56,241 incentive certificates have been issued with a total of TRY 824 
billion in capital investment and just over 2 million new jobs proposed by 
recipients. 
We aggregate the data on incentives to the province level at a quarterly frequency 
and estimate the following DD model with baseline fixed effects and province-
time trends: 
LogPublicFundsp,t = βτ Compp,t × Electiont+τ + γp + λt + γp × t + εp,t (5) 
where PublicFundsp,t measures the total number of investment certificates issued 
to companies in province p in year-quarter t. We alternatively use as a dependent 
variable (log) total number of new jobs that recipients of the investment 
certificates promise to create. If these certificates are allocated based on political 
incentives, then promised job creation should go up in politically aligned 
provinces and down in non-aligned provinces prior to a local election when there 
is high electoral competition. As domestic investors are more likely to respond to 
political influence than foreign investors, we focus on the incentive certificates 
rewarded to the former.38 
Figure B.12 shows the results for the number of certificates in the top panel and 
promised job creation in the bottom panel. We find evidence for a drop in the 
                                               
38 Indeed, the vast majority of incentive certificates, 53,134 out of a total of 56,241, have been 
awarded to local investors during the sample period. 
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number of certificates prior to local elections issued to firms in provinces that are 
politically contested and non- aligned with the central government. The expected 
increase in aligned provinces is not estimated with statistical significance. 
However, there is strong evidence that promised job creation moves in line with 
a tactical redistribution channel. Firms that promise to create more jobs in 
politically contested provinces are awarded more incentive certificates around 
local elections if they are in a politically aligned province, but they are awarded 
fewer certificates if they are in non-aligned provinces. It is important to note that 
there is no requirement by the government for the recipients of incentives to 
work with state banks rather than private banks. However, to the extent that this 
occurs, the reallocation of government incentives around elections can explain 
part of the variation in the lending cycle. 
The second database we create to test the reallocation of public funding 
mechanism draws on construction permits issued by local municipalities. These 
permits are a standard requirement for any entity in Turkey to start a 
construction project and provides details on ownership, intended use, and other 
parameters.39  We collect data on the number of buildings and building area 
covered on all new construction projects initiated by the public sector during the 
2003-2017 period from the Turkish Statistical Institute. We aggregate these data 
to the province level at a quarterly level and estimate Equation (5). 
Figure B.13 shows the results for number of buildings in the top panel and area 
covered in the bottom panel. There is some evidence that the public sector may 
be constructing more buildings in politically aligned provinces in the run up to 
                                               
39 Data include the universe of construction, including projects for housing, office space, 
warehouses, industrial buildings, schools and libraries, and mosques among others. The vast 
majority of construction activity is in housing, both for private and public entities. 
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an election, but this finding is not supported when we look at total building area. 
We also do not find any particular cycle in public construction in non-aligned 
provinces. It is therefore unlikely that the public sector’s new investments in 
housing or other construction projects would drive the lending cycle identified 
earlier. These results also do not support a social lending story, by which state 
banks allocate credit to further social objectives and synergies between the 
central government and allied incumbents lead to better implementation or 
screening of socially desirable projects (Carvalho, 2014). 
Finally, we explore whether corporates adjust their borrowing and investment 
policies because of expected rewards or punishments to local constituencies – 
either directly or via changes in the allocation of public funds – if the local 
government changes hands in an election. We posit that such effects are most 
likely to be found in provinces that actually changed hands between political 
parties during the sample period. We therefore re-estimate Equation 2 after 
dropping these provinces. Figure B.14, panel A, shows that state-bank lending 
continues to suffer in the immediate quarters before an election in opposition 
provinces, but the relative increase in politically aligned provinces that we 
observed earlier is no longer there. When we replicate the analysis with yearly 
data in panel B, we find that both the negative effect in opposition provinces and 
the positive effect in aligned provinces documented earlier remain. These results 
suggest that while expected rewards may partly explain why state-bank lending 
goes up relatively more in aligned provinces, expected punishments do not 
explain why it goes down in non-aligned provinces. 
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5. How does political lending affect economic outcomes? 
5.1 Evidence from administrative data 
We now test whether the state-bank lending cycle induced by local elections 
translates into real outcomes. If it does, then politically contested provinces with 
an opposition mayor are expected to suffer from lower economic activity, while 
those with a politically aligned mayor are expected to see a boost in economic 
activity around local elections. Furthermore, if the real effects are indeed driven 
by politically induced lending, then they should be strongest in industries where 
state banks play a more important role relative to private banks. 
To identify the real effects of politically induced lending, we draw on a new 
administrative dataset covering the period 2006-2016 introduced in Section 3. 
Recall that the underlying data are sourced from balance sheets and income 
statements by all corporates liable to pay tax, capturing the universe of formal 
activity. Our baseline estimates are based on manufacturing industries in line 
with previous literature, which has typically argued that manufacturing jobs are 
especially salient to voters (Bertrand et al., 2018). We show below that our results 
extend to other sectors of the economy and also confirm that voters indeed 
respond most to employment changes in manufacturing. 
Consider the following DDD model: 
LogOutcomei,p,t = βτ Compp,t × StateBankSharei × Electiont+τ 
+ α1Compp,t × StateBankSharei + α2StateBankSharei × Electiont+τ 
+ α3Compp,t × Electiont+τ + α4Compp,t + θi + γp + λt + εi,p,t (6) 
where LogOutcomei,p,t is an economic outcome for industry i, province p, and time 
t. Compp,t is the political contestedness variable created earlier and StateBankSharei 
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measures the share of state banks in total lending by industry nationally. We 
construct StateBankSharei as an industry-level measure that does not vary with 
time and measure it as of the fourth quarter of 2005 to prevent possible reverse 
causality.40 As such, the main coefficient of interest, βτ , captures how economic 
outcomes in industries with an initially higher share of state bank lending and 
located in politically contested provinces move with the election cycle. We 
estimate Equation (6) separately for politically aligned and non-aligned 
provinces. If politically induced lending affects economic outcomes, then βτ 
should be positive in the former group and negative in the latter group. 
This research design is based on two premises. First, state banks systematically 
adjust their local lending behaviour around elections depending on the political 
alignment of the incumbent mayor. Second, the national market share of state 
banks varies considerably across industries. Identification then exploits the 
heterogeneity in industries’ exposure to state banks under the assumption that 
firms can only imperfectly substitute for a change in credit supply from their 
main bank.41 This assumption implies that politically induced lending affects real 
economic outcomes to the extent that firms in the opposition provinces suffer 
aggregate financial constraints and firms in allied provinces see their constraints 
relax. In other words, if firms are able to perfectly switch between state and 
                                               
40 Note that StateBankSharei is measured at the national, and not province, level. It is possible 
that banks and industries sort into a certain province, which would affect the market share of 
banks in that particular province. Unobserved shocks to industries could then affect demand for 
loans in that province. We use the industry market share of banks at the national level to reduce 
concerns that may arise from sorting. If there are industry-specific shocks that coincide with 
local elections, these should affect all provinces equally and regardless of political alignment. 
41 A rich literature has documented the stickiness of firm-bank relationships and how firms’ 
access to credit suffers in the face of shocks to their relationship lenders, especially in the case of 
small business lending. See, for instance, Greenstone et al. (2014) and references therein. 
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private banks – e.g., there are competitive spillovers between banks – then firms 
in opposition areas need not experience financial constraints. 
This is an assumption that we can test directly in the data. We estimate Equation 
(6) with (log) total bank debt as our first dependent variable. Table 5 shows 
estimates for βτ when τ = 0 (i.e. in the year before a local election) for politically 
aligned provinces in columns (1)-(4) and non-aligned provinces in columns (5)-
(8). We present estimates that control for alternative sets of fixed effects. There is 
strong evidence that industries with a high share of state bank lending located in 
politically contested provinces experience a reduction in total corporate 
borrowing if the incumbent mayor is from an opposition party. We find the 
opposite if the incumbent mayor is politically aligned, but these estimates are not 
statistically significant. Figure 8 presents results for the full election cycle, which 
control for province time trends. It shows that politically induced lending creates 
aggregate financial constraints for many businesses in non-aligned provinces, 
and likely relaxes them in aligned provinces, especially in the run up to local 
elections. 
Data allow us to dig deeper into how corporate borrowing is affected by the 
political lending cycle. In Appendix C, we present estimates when the outcome 
of interest is short- term or long-term bank debt (Figure C.1). While we observe 
the cycle in both types of corporate borrowing, estimates show that the increase 
in aligned provinces and the decrease in non-aligned provinces are more 
pronounced in long-term corporate borrowing. As loans with longer maturities 
are typically used for capital investment purposes in Turkey, and those with 
shorter maturities for working capital purposes, the electoral cycle is likely to 
affect economic outcomes through an investment channel. 
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Tables 6 and 7 show results when τ = 0 for employment and net sales, 
respectively. We find that employment and sales are higher in the run up to local 
elections in industries with a higher state bank share of total lending and located 
in politically aligned provinces. However, these estimates are not precisely 
estimated. In contrast, we find a highly significant and negative impact on both 
employment and sales for industries located in opposition provinces. These 
results hold across specifications with province time trends or a full set of 
province-time and industry-time fixed effects. Controlling for these fixed effects, 
Column (8) in Table 6 indicates that a 5 percentage point increase in the share of 
state banks in an industry would be associated with a 14% drop in industry 
employment before a local election in opposition provinces. The corresponding 
drop in net sales, according to the same specification in Table 7, would be 11%. 
Figure 9 shows estimates for the full election cycle. Panel A shows that the 
negative impact on employment in non-aligned provinces is already discernible 
one year ahead of a local election, though small in size. However, the positive 
impact on employment in politically aligned provinces is visible only in the year 
ahead of a local election. Panel B shows a similar trend for sales. These results 
show that politically induced credit constraints have sizable negative effects on 
the real economy when local governments do not belong to the same party as the 
central government. 
We report additional results in Appendix C. The above estimates are based on a 
sample of manufacturing industries in metropolitan provinces. Tables C.1-C.2 
and Figure C.2 extend our results to all sectors of the economy. The negative 
impact on employment and net sales for all sectors are smaller than for the 
manufacturing sample, but they continue to be statistically significant for non-
aligned provinces in the run up to an election. In these regions, a 5 percentage 
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point increase in the share of state banks is now associated with a 3.8% drop in 
industry employment and 3.2% in industry net sales. Figure C.3 replicates these 
findings when we extend the sample to include all provinces and manufacturing 
industries. Figure C.4 replicates them for total assets in the top panel, but does 
not reveal a similar cycle for the number of enterprises in operation in the bottom 
panel. This suggests that political cycles affect real economic outcomes primarily 
through their impact on existing businesses rather than on firm entry or exit. 
5.2 Evidence on efficiency & misallocation 
There is increasing evidence that reallocation of resources from low to high 
productivity users is an important source of growth. For instance, Larrain and 
Stumpner (2017) show that capital account liberalisation in Eastern Europe 
increased aggregate productivity through relieving firm-level financial 
constraints and a more efficient allocation of capital across firms. Bai et al. (2017) 
document that state-level banking deregulation led to large gains in industry 
productivity in the U.S. through the reallocation of labour. In this sub-section, we 
ask whether the electoral cycle leads to a misallocation of financial resources in 
Turkey. If politically induced lending redistributes resources from more to less 
productive users, then it can lead to a reduction in aggregate industry 
productivity. 
Consider the following model: 
∆LogCrediti,p,t = βτ Eff iciencyi,p × Electiont+τ + α1Eff iciencyi,p + θi + γp + λt + εi,p,t 
(7) 
 
where ∆LogCrediti,p,t = LogCrediti,p,t − LogCrediti,p,t−1 captures the year-on-year 
growth rate of total bank credit that appear on the balance sheets of all firms 
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located in province p and operating in industry i. We proxy aggregate industry 
productivity by the asset turnover rate, which captures the efficiency with which 
an industry uses its capital to generate sales. For each province and industry pair, 
we define: Efficiencyp,i = NetSalesp,i/TotalAssetsp,i using the beginning-of-sample 
information from 2006. This ensures that our efficiency measure is independent 
of future credit trends in the sample period. Industry fixed effects in (7) account 
for the fact that some industries naturally require a greater amount of assets to 
generate each dollar of sales. Province and year fixed effects capture 
unobservable factors at the local level and aggregate shocks at the national level. 
Note that we also control for initial levels of efficiency. The coefficient β then 
identifies how credit growth at the industry-province level varies with initial 
productivity over the election cycle. 
Table 8 shows results from this exercise across different specifications when τ = 
0. Columns (1)-(3) indicate that industry-province pairs with greater initial 
efficiency typically experience greater credit growth during the sample period, 
unless there are upcoming local elections. The negative coefficient on the 
interaction term is sufficiently larger in ab- solute size than the positive 
coefficient on initial efficiency, so that industry-province pairs that are initially 
less productive experience greater credit growth in the run up to local elections. 
This result holds, and is typically more precisely estimated, with a full set of 
province-time and industry-time fixed effects included. It points at strong 
evidence that the political lending cycle identified earlier leads to a considerable 
misallocation of aggregate bank credit. 
We replicate this exercise for the sample of politically aligned provinces in 
columns (4)-(6) and non-aligned provinces in columns (7)-(9). We find similar 
patterns in both samples, but estimates are more precise for non-aligned 
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provinces. Politically induced financial misallocation appears stronger in these 
regions, where it likely distorts aggregate efficiency more than in aligned 
provinces. It is possible that such misallocation is not concentrated around local 
elections in aligned provinces, if state banks favour these regions in non-election 
years as well due to the central government’s constant patronage of its 
strongholds. 
We extend our estimates of Equation (7) to the full election cycle in Figure 10. 
Panel A shows estimates of βτ from the sample of metropolitan provinces and 
panel B from all provinces with specifications including province-time fixed 
effects. Stripping local time-varying shocks in this way, we do not find much 
evidence for misallocation of credit in non-election years. We find that 
misallocation during election years is especially pronounced for non-aligned 
provinces in both panels. In light of earlier findings, this suggests that province- 
industry pairs that are initially more efficient are also those experiencing the 
largest increases in aggregate credit constraints in these regions. As they respond 
to these constraints by cutting down on employment growth, the impact on 
industry efficiency and productive jobs is expected to be substantially negative, 
and possibly long-lasting. 
5.3 Do jobs affect elections? 
In this sub-section, we check whether voters judge incumbent mayors based on 
local economic conditions in the run up to local elections. We focus on the role 
played by employment in particular, as a rich literature documents a strong 
correlation between changes in employment, especially in manufacturing, and 
the votes going to the incumbent party (Bertrand et al., 2018). If there is no such 
correlation, then it would not be in the interests of politicians to direct bank credit 
towards or away from manufacturing firms that affect job creation the most. 
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Results of this exercise with alternative specifications are in Table 9. We regress 
the change in the vote share won by an incumbent party between the current and 
previous local elections on manufacturing employment growth in the past one 
year in columns (1)-(5).42 We find a strong correlation despite an admittedly small 
sample size. Controlling for election and province fixed effects, a 10% growth in 
total employment at the province level is associated with a 5.1 percentage point 
increase in the vote share of an incumbent party in metropolitan provinces. This 
estimate is lower at 1 percentage point increase in the sample of all provinces, 
which explains why tactical redistribution of credit can target metropolitan cities 
in particular. 
We also confirm two long-standing arguments from the political economy 
literature. First, previous research argues that voters tend to forget events that 
occurred early on in the electoral cycle and attach greater weight to more recent 
economic developments (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). In line with this myopic voter 
argument, we find that employment growth in the past two years before a local 
election has less explanatory power for incumbent parties’ performance at the 
electoral box (columns (6)-(10) of Table 9). While there is still a strong and 
positive correlation, point estimates are around half of those in columns (1)-(5). 
Second, we replicate this exercise and show in Table C.3 of Appendix C that non-
manufacturing employment growth has minimal explanatory power for 
incumbent parties’ electoral success. This complements evidence from earlier 
studies that policy makers target the manufacturing sector in particular, 
ostensibly for their job creation potential, to influence election outcomes. 
                                               
42 We calculate total manufacturing employment in each province by aggregating industry-level 
employment figures from the administrative data. 
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As a final test of how important jobs are to re-election prospects for incumbent 
parties, we collect data from the national accounts compiled by the Turkish 
Statistical Institute. These accounts provide measures of GDP by province and 
major sectors over a period of 2004-2014. This allows us to relate changes in the 
manufacturing component of province- level GDP and test the myopic voter 
argument for a longer horizon. Results are in Table C.4. We find a positive 
correlation that increases in size when manufacturing GDP growth is measured 
closer to local elections. These estimates are not always precise, suggesting that 
job creation plays a much more prominent role than growth in value added to 
explain the re-election chances of incumbent parties. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we test for the presence of politically motivated distribution of 
financial resources in Turkey using a dataset with detailed information on 
banking activity and local economic outcomes. Our dataset is novel along several 
dimensions and helps us achieve stronger identification than earlier studies, 
while shedding light on some of the theoretical arguments voiced in the 
literature. For instance, high frequency data allow us to pinpoint the effects of 
politically induced lending and differentiate between pre-election tactical re- 
distribution and post-election rewards or punishment mechanisms. 
Our main findings are two-fold. First, we show that state banks in Turkey engage 
in politically motivated lending around local elections when compared with 
private banks. This election-induced cycle is particularly salient in corporate 
loans in the run up to elections and it is targeted at politically competitive 
provinces based on their political alignment. In particular, state banks increase 
lending to the corporate sector relative to private banks in politically attractive 
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provinces when an incumbent mayor is aligned with the ruling party, while they 
reduce it if the incumbent mayor is from an opposition party. In aggregate, 
lending by state banks is lower prior to elections compared with private banks, 
which constitutes a first piece of evidence that political involvement in bank 
lending leads to a drop in access to credit. 
Second, we show that this redistribution of credit has real consequences as it 
leads to a significant reduction in local economic activity in opposition provinces 
that are politically contested. Specifically, firms located in such provinces become 
credit constrained due to the reduction in state bank lending and respond by 
reducing employment and sales. It is crucial to understand the distributive 
implications of political lending to inform policies about circumscribing the 
latitude of governments to intervene in the economy (Cole, 2009). Our results 
suggest that aggregate credit constraints affect the relatively more efficient 
province- industry pairs in politically contested areas, which shed jobs in return. 
This shows that politically induced lending distorts the efficient allocation of 
credit and potentially reduces aggregate productivity in these areas, coming at a 
great cost to local economies. 
Our findings support theories of tactical redistribution to manipulate voters for 
re-election prospects. Rolling estimations in non-election years show some 
evidence that the central government may have resorted to patronage when it 
did not have election concerns. We document suggestive evidence that the 
tactical reallocation of bank credit, via its impact on jobs, helps the central 
government increase the electoral success of its allied mayoral candidates and 
decrease that of opponents. This provides one of the first pieces of evidence on 
how voters can be manipulated via the distortion of financial intermediaries. 
Future research should explore how such distortions and governments’ role in 
financial misallocation can be minimised.  
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 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: District-level political alignment in two non-metropolitan provinces 
 
 
(a) A politically aligned province in 2004 elections 
 
 
(b) A politically non-aligned province in 2004 elections 
 
 
Notes: Panel A shows a province in which the elected central district mayor is aligned with the central 
government and Panel B shows a province in which the elected central district mayor is non-aligned. “C” 
in red colour stands for the central district. Politically aligned districts are given in yellow and non-aligned 
districts are given in varying shades of gray corresponding to different opposition parties. 
 Figure 2: Political competition and alignment in metropolitan provinces 
 
 
 
LossMargin > 15% 7% < LossMargin < 15% LossMargin < 7% WinMargin < 7% 7% < WinMargin < 15% WinMargin > 15% Non−metropolitan  
Provinces 
 
(a) 2004 local elections 
 
 
 
LossMargin > 15% 7% < LossMargin < 15% LossMargin < 7% WinMargin < 7% 7% < WinMargin < 15% WinMargin > 15% Non−metropolitan  
Provinces 
 
(b) 2009 local elections 
 
 
 
LossMargin > 15% 7% < LossMargin < 15% LossMargin < 7% WinMargin < 7% 7% < WinMargin < 15% WinMargin > 15% Non−metropolitan  
Provinces 
 
(c) 2014 local elections 
Notes: Panels A, B, and C show the win/loss margins for the governing party in 2004, 2009, and 2014 local 
elections, respectively. Politically aligned provinces are in shades of yellow and non-aligned provinces 
are in shades of gray. 
   
   
  
   
 
    
  
   
   
  
  
 
   
   
  
   
 
    
  
   
   
  
  
 
   
   
  
   
 
    
  
   
   
  
  
 
 Figure 3: Aggregate credit and banks’ market shares, 2003-2017 
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(a) Aggregate credit by bank type 
 
 
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 
 
Non−allied − Low Competition Non−allied − High 
Competition Allied − Low Competition Allied − High Competition 
 
(b) Credit market share of state banks by political alignment and competition 
Notes: Panel A shows the evolution of the stock of all cash loans extended by state-owned and private 
banks during the period 2003-2017. Panel B shows the evolution of the market share of state banks in total 
cash loans during the same period by political alignment and competition. Sample includes all provinces 
in panel A and metropolitan provinces in panel B. Politically aligned provinces are in shades of yellow 
and non-aligned provinces are in shades of gray in panel B. 
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 Figure 4: State bank lending relative to private banks over the election cycle 
 
 
 
 
(a) Sample: Metropolitan provinces 
 
 
 
 
(b) Sample: All provinces 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (1) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ 
takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Each plotted coefficient 
comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression 
controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Panel A includes 
metropolitan provinces and panel B includes the full sample. 
 Figure 5: Tactical redistribution of state bank lending over the election cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% 
confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and 
province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each 
panel. 
 Figure 6: Corporate vs. consumer loans: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit 
over the election cycle 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Corporate loans 
 
 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Consumer loans 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% 
confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and 
province time trends. Panel A shows estimates for corporate loans and panel B shows estimates for 
consumer loans. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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 Figure 7: Share of non-performing corporate loans over the election cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ 
takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes 
metropolitan provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates 
show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed 
effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned 
provinces in each panel. 
 Figure 8: Effects of political lending on corporate borrowing in manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (6) estimated on yearly data (2006-2016) when τ takes 
values from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections, for metropolitan provinces. Each 
plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence 
intervals. Each regression controls for our baseline set of fixed  effects and province time trends. 
Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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Figure 9:  Effects of political lending on corporate activity in manufacturing 
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(a) Dependent variable: Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Net sales 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (6) estimated on yearly data (2006-2016) when τ takes 
values from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections, for metropolitan provinces. Each 
plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence 
intervals. Each regression controls for a set of fixed effects and province time trends. Panel A shows 
estimates for employment and panel B shows estimates for net sales. Estimates are reported separately 
for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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Figure 10: Electoral cycle in the allocation of bank credit by initial efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Sample: Metropolitan provinces 
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(b) Sample: All provinces 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (7) estimated on yearly data when τ takes values from -2 
to +2, indicating the number of years around elections. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single 
regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for 
province-time and industry-time fixed effects. Panel A shows estimates for the sample of metropolitan 
provinces and panel B shows estimates for the sample of all provinces. Estimates are reported 
separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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 Table 1: Composition and performance of Turkish banks by ownership 
 
 
 1999 2004 2015 
Panel A: 
Number of banks 
 
Total 
 
54 
 
34 
 
33 
 State 4 3 3 
 Private 50 31 30 
Number of branches Total 6,946 6,087 11,150 
 State 2,865 2,149 3,681 
 Private 4,081 3,938 7,469 
Number of employees Total 152,578 122,227 195,613 
 State 72,007 39,467 58,211 
 Private 80,571 82,760 137,402 
Panel B: 
NPLs / Loans 
 
State 
 
10.0% 
 
11.1% 
 
2.7% 
 Private 3.6% 4.9% 3.3% 
Return on Assets State 1.1% 2.5% 1.4% 
 Private 4.5% 1.6% 1.0% 
Equity / Assets State 4.1% 9.4% 10.1% 
 Private 12.9% 15.8% 11.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table summarises the composition and financial performance of the banking sector in 
Turkey. State banks are defined as banks in which the central government has a controlling stake. 
Private banks are defined as all other banks. We exclude investment banks, development banks, and 
participation banks. NPLs denotes non-performing loans. 
 Table 2:  Summary statistics 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min Max Obs. Source 
 
 
Panel A: Quarterly cash loans (2007q4-2017q4) 
 
log Total loans 13.50 13.39 1.40 9.24 19.28 6,642 FinTu¨rk 
log Corporate loans 12.23 12.15 1.61 7.16 18.58 6,642 FinTu¨rk 
log Consumer loans 12.61 12.54 1.28 8.67 17.69 6,642 FinTu¨rk 
log Non-performing loans 10.03 9.94 1.51 4.37 15.67 6,642 FinTu¨rk 
log State bank loans 13.40 13.28 1.20 10.62 18.36 3,321 FinTu¨rk 
log Private bank loans 13.59 13.54 1.57 9.24 19.28 3,321 FinTu¨rk 
log State non-performing loans 9.76 9.59 1.26 5.94 14.33 3,321 FinTu¨rk 
log Private non-performing loans 10.31 10.33 1.69 4.37 15.67 3,321 FinTu¨rk 
 
Panel B: Election data  
Aligned (dummy) 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 243 TurkStat 
Competition 0.82 0.85 0.15 0.24 0.99 243 TurkStat 
 
Panel C: Annual economic data (2006-2016) 
 
log Number of establishments 3.85 3.71 1.48 0.00 9.96 9,785 MoI 
log Bank debt 16.91 16.95 2.40 8.11 23.14 7,646 MoI 
log Employment 6.22 6.17 1.98 0.00 12.77 9,785 MoI 
log Net sales 18.16 18.07 2.27 12.03 24.85 9,677 MoI 
log Total assets 18.75 18.68 2.03 13.65 24.80 7,972 MoI 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis. All variables are in 
logs except in Panel B. Aligned indicates whether a province is ruled at the time by a mayor from the 
ruling party or not. Competition is defined as 1 minus the win margin. MoI stands for Ministry of 
Industry. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Figure A.1: State bank lending relative to private banks over the election cycle: 
Yearly estimates (2003-2017) 
 
 
 
−2y −1y Election +1y +2y 
 
(a) Sample: Metropolitan provinces 
 
 
−2y −1y Election +1y +2y 
 
(b) Sample: All provinces 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (1) estimated on yearly data when τ takes values from -2 to 
+2, indicating the number of years around elections. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single 
regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local 
branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Panel A includes metropolitan 
provinces and panel B includes the full sample. 
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 Figure A.2: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: Yearly 
estimates (2003-2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on yearly data when τ  takes values from -2 
to +2, indicating the number of years around elections. Sample includes metropolitan provinces. Each 
plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence 
intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time 
trends. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces. 
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 Appendix B 
 
Figure B.1: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Competition dummy defined by top 25% of distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. The competition variable equals 1 for the upper 25% of the continuous competition variable in 
the pooled sample of province-years, and 0 otherwise. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single 
regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local 
branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for 
aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.2: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Competition dummy defined by top 50% of distribution for each election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. The competition variable equals 1 for the upper 50% of the continuous competition variable 
for each local election separately treated, and 0 otherwise. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single 
regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local 
branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for 
aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.3: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Continuous competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ 
takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes 
metropolitan provinces. The competition variable is used in its continuous form. Each plotted coefficient 
comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression 
controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are 
reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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 Figure B.4: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: Using 
previous election outcomes to define competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. The competition variable equals 1 for the upper 50% of the continuous competition variable 
based on previous election’s outcome, and 0 otherwise. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single 
regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local 
branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for 
aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.5: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Controlling for bank branches in continuous form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. Bank-province-time controls include bank branches in continuous log form. Each plotted 
coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each 
regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates 
are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.6: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Controlling for customer deposits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. Bank-province-time controls include customer de- posits in continuous log form. Each plotted 
coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each 
regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates 
are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.7: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: Dropping 
three largest metropolitan cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. The estimation sample excludes the three largest metropolitan cities in the country. Each 
plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. 
Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. 
Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.8: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Dropping one local election at a time with yearly data 
 
 
(a) Sample: Excluding 2014 election cycle 
 
 
(b) Sample: Excluding 2009 election cycle 
 
 
(c) Sample: Excluding 2004 election cycle 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on yearly data (2003-2017) when τ takes 
values from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% 
confidence intervals. Each regression our baseline controls and province time trends. Estimates are 
reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.9: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: Excluding 
foreign bank lending from the reference group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes metropolitan 
provinces. The reference group only includes domestic private banks and excludes foreign bank lending. 
Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence 
intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time 
trends. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.10: Political uncertainty and bank lending 
 
 
(a) Sample: Quarterly data, 2007q4-2017q4 
 
 
(b) Sample: Yearly data, 2003-2017 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (3) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10 in panel A, and on yearly data (2003-2017) when τ takes values from -2 to +2 in 
panel B. Sample includes metropolitan provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; 
bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our 
baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and 
non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.11: Political uncertainty and state-bank lending relative to private banks 
 
 
(a) Sample: Quarterly data, 2007q4-2017q4 
 
 
(b) Sample: Yearly data, 2003-2017 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (4) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10 in panel A, and on yearly data (2003-2017) when τ takes values from -2 to +2 in 
panel B. Sample includes metropolitan provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; 
bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our 
baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and 
non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.12: Is there a political cycle in investment incentive certificates? 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Number of investment incentive certificates awarded 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Number of jobs promised by certificate recipients 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (5) estimated on quarterly data (2003q1-2017q4) when τ 
takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes all 
provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% 
confidence intervals. Each regression controls for province and time fixed effects. Estimates are reported 
separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
 Figure B.13: Is there a political cycle in new public construction? 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Number of new buildings started by public sector 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Total building area started by public sector 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (5) estimated on quarterly data (2003q1-2017q4) when τ 
takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around elections. Sample includes all 
provinces. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% 
confidence intervals. Each regression controls for province and time fixed effects. Estimates are reported 
separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel.
 Figure B.14: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the election cycle: 
Dropping metropolitan cities that changed hands 
 
 
(a) Sample: Quarterly data, 2007q4-2017q4 
 
 
(a) Sample: Yearly data, 2003-2017 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (2) estimated on quarterly data (2007q4-2017q4) when τ takes 
values from -10 to +10 in panel A, and on yearly data (2003-2017) when τ takes values from -2 to +2 in 
panel B. Sample includes metropolitan provinces. The estimation sample excludes provinces that changed 
hands from one political party to another during the sample period. Each plotted coefficient comes from 
a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for 
local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Estimates are reported 
separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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Figure C.1: Effects of political lending on short-term and long-term corporate borrowing in 
manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Short-term bank debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
     1.748   
 −0.538  −0.843      
   −2.595   
      
       
 
(b) Dependent variable: Long-term bank debt 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (6) estimated on yearly data (2006-2016) when τ takes values 
from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections, for metropolitan provinces. Each plotted 
coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each 
regression controls for a set of fixed effects and province time trends.  Panel A shows estimates for total 
corporate bank debt and panel B shows estimates for total corporate long-term bank debt.  Estimates are 
reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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 Figure C.2: Effects of political lending on corporate activity in all sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Net sales 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (6) estimated on yearly data (2006-2015) when τ takes values 
from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections, in metropolitan provinces and including 
all sectors of the economy. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates 
show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for a set of fixed effects and province time 
trends. Panel A shows estimates for employment and panel B shows estimates for net sales. Estimates 
are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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 Figure C.3: Effects of political lending on corporate activity in manufacturing across 
all provinces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Net sales 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (6) estimated on yearly data (2006-2016) when τ takes values 
from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections, for all provinces. Each plotted coefficient 
comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression 
controls for a set of fixed effects and province time trends. Panel A shows estimates for employment and 
panel B shows estimates for net sales. Estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned 
provinces in each panel. 
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 Figure C.4: Effects of political lending on corporate activity in manufacturing 
industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Total Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: Number of Enterprises 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows results of equation (6) estimated on yearly data (2006-2016) when τ takes values 
from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections, for metropolitan provinces. Each plotted 
coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each 
regression controls for a set of fixed effects and province time trends. Panel A shows estimates for total 
assets and panel B shows estimates for number of enterprises in operation. Estimates are reported 
separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel. 
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